From the start of this conflict, I have made clear that fabrications regarding what has transpired will not be tolerated. With that in mind, today I filed an attorney disciplinary conflict against Wayne Cyron, who represents perjuring priest Bob Malm.
The complaint arises from Cyron’s fabrication, in his recent motion for a protective order to keep perjuring priest Bob Malm’s discovery responses confidential, that the previous court order in part addressed my “relentless and offensive blogging.”
It did no such thing. Nor could it, absent a true threat, for the First Amendment protects unpopular blogging, no matter how offensive it may be. Thus, I submit that Cyron’s comments are a knowing false statement of law and fact to the courts, and thus violate disciplinary rule 3.3, “Candor toward the Tribunal.”
In fact, were Cyron’s claims true, Donald Trump could get a protective order against news outlets, on the grounds that they were “relentlessly” disseminating “fake news.” That, of course, runs inherently contrary to our country’s policy of ordered liberty.
You’ll see in my letter, part of the posted document, I ask Cyron to immediately retract his false statement and correct the record.
Although I filed directly with the Virginia State Bar, I forwarded the complaint to Cyron, co-counsel Diane DiBlasio, and the Church Pension Group claims examiner handling the case.
Hopefully, this makes clear to the church and its legal team that I will not tolerate any fabrications, either by the attorneys in question, or by perjuring priest Bob Malm.
Meanwhile, defense counsel would be prudent to recall the comment 11 associated with Rule 3.3, which provides:
Except in the defense of a criminal accused, the rule generally recognized is that, if necessary to rectify the situation, an advocate must disclose the existence of the client’s deception to the court or to the other party. Such a disclosure can result in grave consequences to the client, including not only a sense of betrayal but also loss of the case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the alternative is that the lawyer cooperates in deceiving the court, thereby subverting the truth-finding process which the adversary system is designed to implement. See Rule 1.2(c). Furthermore, unless it is clearly understood that the lawyer will act upon the duty to disclose the existence of false evidence, the client can simply reject the lawyer’s advice to reveal the false evidence and insist that the lawyer keep silent. Thus the client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being a party to fraud on the court.
I am confident that all three defense counsel now know that Bob Malm committed perjury in the prior proceedings. Thus, all three have an obligation to disclose that perjury to the court.
For the record, here is my email to defense counsel reminding them to correct fraud on the part of their client, with specific reference to Bob Malm’s perjury.
